The ANC is the new IFP

Is the ANC the new IFP?

The National Chamber of Provinces recently concluded public hearing on the Traditional Courts Bill. This bill seeks to give traditional leaders the power to preside over certain civil disputes and criminal offences in the areas under their jurisdiction. The public hearings were an opportunity for those affected by the proposed legislation to voice their concerns about its impact. It was also an opportunity for the provincial legislatures to claim they had consulted affected communities before they endorsed the legislation.

Not surprisingly the bill was met with a great deal of resistance by civil society and community members. It is clear from the public hearings that community members are concerned that traditional leaders, some of whom are corrupt, ineffectual or partisan, are formally being given greater powers. Civil societies' objections centred on the negative impact the bill, if passed, will have on women's rights. The general thrust of criticism is that hereditary leadership in a highly patriarchal and authoritarian social setting undermines the rights of all commoners, particularly women, and is in clear conflict with the constitutions core premise of "equality". Essentially the bill entrenches the right,by birth, of some to judge and govern and the obligation  of all others, by virtue of where they live, to be judged and ruled.

The hearings in kwaZulu-Natal were particularly enlightening. They showed unequivocal support among traditional leaders for the bill. The reason for this consensus is clear as senior traditional leaders are all set to benefit from this and other proposed changes. However the most remarkable part of the hearings  was the absence of the antipathy between the ANC and the IFP that has long marked politics in kaZulu-Natal  - particularly when traditional rights and culture were concerned. There was no sign of dissent between chiefs aligned to different parties or between the chiefs and the sponsors of the bill i.e. Luthuli House.

This consensus highlights the extent to which the political landscape in kwaZulu-Natal has changed.  Those seeking to preserve traditional African culture, hereditary rights or general social conservatism in kwaZulu-Natal can now identify with the ruling party rather than with the IFP whose influence  has been waning since 1994. The ANC has managed to appropriate a rich political terrain once monopolised by the IFP.  Understanding how much the terrain has changed rests on acknowledgment of the extent to which the ANC has moved to the IFP's value system rather than through the political evolution of Zululand residents. It is this change in the ANC that invites the perspective that the ANC is the new IFP. It is the ANC that now promises to preserve hereditary rights, traditional values and promote the associated social conservatism.

The reason for the shift in the ANC is clear. In 2009 the ANC was returned to power with votes just shy of a two thirds majority. When compared to the previous national election (in 2004) voters gave the ANC an additional 1.2 million votes. This increase in votes was widely seen as an endorsement of the ANC under Zuma's leadership. However the addition votes were garnered not, as the political pundits claimed, from the left, the unions or from the youth. The increase in votes were almost entirely from traditional areas in kwaZulu-Natal and other provinces.  As people living in other provinces on "traditional" land had largely thrown their lot in with the ANC already their contribution to the increased ANC vote was less pronounced. 

Traditional leaders are key to the continued support of any political party in what was previously referred to as "tribal areas". The chiefs exert tremendous influence on whether or not people vote and on whom they vote for. For example in the 2009 election the IFP still managed to get 800 000 votes and these votes are now, in a very real sense, there for the taking. Given the changing political landscape there is little reason to suggest that the chiefs will take them to the new National Freedom Party or keep them with the IFP.

Inevitably there is a qui pro quo for this support. The first sign of the quid pro quo was the establishment of a Department of Rural Development and Land Reform within a month of the election. This was followed by the re-invigoration of traditional councils and , belatedly, the holding of traditional council elections. Reviving the Traditional Courts Bill (which had stalled in 2008) followed.  Still to come is the  National Traditional Affairs Bill which may well extend local government powers to traditional leaders.

All this bodes poorly for the IFP as traditional leaders no longer have to look to the IFP to advance their interests and traditional rights in general. The ANC is now happily fulfilling this role - even at the expense of the core values of the constitution and what the ANC's has been describing as its own political heritage. This said, the support that the traditional leaders bring will inevitably be at the cost of some of support it currently enjoys from what the ANC itself terms "progressives". For example, although the Womens League has been silent about the promotion of the Traditional Courts bill their complicity in the promotion of such patriarchal systems can not continue indefinitely. Until then the extent to which  ANC support is derived from traditional leaders is the extent to which Zuma's position will be secure relative to the "progressives".

South Africa and BRICsa - fading to nothing?

South Africa recently became the latest member of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, Indian and China) group of economies. Membership of BRIC should carry, if anything, at least the promise of rapid economic growth.  Unfortunately South Africa however has not been playing in the same league as the original members of BRIC in either terms of size or the rate of economic growth. This point can best be illustrated by contrasting South Africa and China (the biggest economy in BRICSA).

In 2011, according to Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal) the Gross Domestic product (GDP) of China was US$ 7,298,147 million. By contrast the South African GDP was a "mere" US$ 408,074 million.

The major imbalance is highlighted by differential growth rates. In 2011 the growth rate of China may fall to as low as 8% per annum. South Africa, by contrast, would be fortunate to reach 4% growth. Using these figures it is easy to see that the Chinese economy will grow by US$ 583,851 million. This is 37 percent greater than the entire South African GDP -  even when accounting for the 4% growth rate. In other words the growth of the Chinese economy alone exceeds, each year,  the size of the South African economy. This discrepancy will be aggravated by the big differences in annual growth rates. These factors will ensure that, should current trends continue, South Africa will become an ever less significant part of BRICSA each year.

However being (relatively) small is not a measure of potential and, past growth is not an indication of what will happen in the future. What is an indication of potential are the policies and practices of the respective governments. China epitomises the "developmental state" a label South Africa statesmen adopt at every opportunity. The defining feature of the developmental state is its prioirtisation of economic growth. In other words these economies prioritize growth above other factors like government control and even, other things being equal, profitability.

It is here where South Africa hamstrings itself by prioritising the political agenda of the ruling party above economic growth - even while stating that economic development is its primary objective. In essence economic growth is subverted by a political agenda which seeks greater control of the economy by central government while refashioning the racial profile of the social and economic  landscape - even as this agenda undermines service delivery and economic development.

iPad and Vodacom pay-as-you go

The 3G  connection on my iPad suddenly stopped working for no apparent reason. It kept telling me that I had no data left and prompted me to add data "now" or "later". This was despite me having just bought bundles of data.

I eventually tracked the problem to an invitation to update my settings (which I accepted). Essentially this change the APN setting under "Cellular Data" from "internet" to "iphone.vodacom.za".

Changing the setting back to"internet" solves the problem (leave the Username and Password blank).

It seems that Apple and/or Vodacom are keen to create the eronneous impression that only 3G subscription services, and not prepaid, works on the iPad.

Huawei E367 on linux

The Huawei E367 modem is a fast USB modem for 3g connectivity. It worked  out-of-the box when connected to Telkom's 8ta service via a TP-LINK router. However when I attempt to use the modem directly (i.e. not through the router) I got the following error when installing the module:

FATAL: module vendor=0x12d1 not found

Fortunately getting the E367 to work on a linux box takes only about five minutes of effort. It requires the installation of the "modeswitch" package, configuration of the "modeswitch data", installation of the module and the usual setting up of the connection.

Install the "modeswitch" package (using apt, yum etc.) . At this stage installing the  package will not necessarily solve the problem as the details of the vendor and product have yet to be added to the configuration. As root edit the file:

'/etc/usb_modeswitch.conf" (Debian systems).

Append the following text to that file.


########################################################
# Huawei E367

EnableLogging=1

DefaultVendor= 0x12d1
DefaultProduct=0x1446

TargetVendor=  0x12d1
TargetProductList="1001,1406,140b,140c,1412,141b,14ac,1506"

CheckSuccess=20

MessageEndpoint= 0x01
MessageContent="55534243123456780000000000000011062000000100000000000000000000"

##############################################################

Now, with the modem attached, run (as root) the command
"usb_modeswitch"

You should not have another usbserial device running so unplug it or run the command "rmmod usbserial".

At this stage you need to install the E367 module, as root do a:
 "modprobe usbserial vendor=0x12d1 product=0x1506"

(or change product code as reflected by the command "lsusb").



You may now configure the modem using NetworkManager or whatever other system you use. For 8ta this usually requires indicting only the dial number *99# and the APN as "internet".

For full instruction see:
http://www.zeroshell.net/eng/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2986

Tornadoes in South Africa

Recently I had to estimate the probability of a tornado damaging a school in South Africa. The issue was made all the more topical by the appearance of two destructive tornadoes on 2 October. The one occurred in Duduza in the east rand and the other half way across the country in Ficksburg.  Was this a freak incident or are tornadoes a greater danger than we suppose? Drawing on a study by Milford and Goliger 1997 it would appear that approximately 15 destructive (greater than force F0) tornadoes occur each year on average.

The graphic below shows the Milford and Goliger's estimates of the likelihood a tornado occurs (in a given year) in any 1km square area of the country. The likelihood ranges from an effective 0 in the Western and Northern Cape, through one in 100 000 in the Eastern Cape and Free State (including Ficksburg). The likelihood increases to one in 10 000 in parts of Gauteng and the KwaZulu Natal midlands (including Duduza).

The vast majority of Tornadoes  go unreported as they occur in the sparsely populated areas - like large tracts of the Eastern Cape and Free State. Given that only about 15 destructive tornadoes occur each year  the occurrence of two tornadoes in populated areas on the same day would be highly unusual. However there is some doubt as to whether  the two could be classified as F1 or higher. F0 tornadoes are unlikely to damage permanent structures. Usually the  damage associated with F0 tornadoes are the result of peripheral damage - like tree branches falling onto houses. Unfortunately if a F0 tornado is able to topple an old tree or break  branches off they are more than likely to be able to level shacks in Duduza or force poorly built structures to collapse.

The two incidents may thus say more about the quality of housing than they do about the prevalence of tornadoes.

Service delivery protests: a new trend?

In early September two violent "service delivery" protests took place in Gauteng. The first was in Thembalihle informal settlement outside Lenasia, the second was in Tembisa on the east Rand. Although media coverage treated the two protests as similar, dubbing them "service protests", they have very different origins and profoundly different implications for the political future of the province.

Thembalihle

The Thembalihle protests were the latest resurgence of a dispute that started at least two decades ago. This is an informal housing  settlement located adjacent to Lenasia. However the settlement is located on land unsuited for habitation or development. Much of the ground in the region is dolomitic and prone to developing sinkholes which pose an ongoing threat to life and property. However sinkholes occur infrequently and thus do not appear, at least to Thembalihle residents, to present an imminent danger. Subsequently when Thembalihle residents  contrast their service levels and the level of investment in infrastructure to that of their middle class Lenasia neighbours they feel aggrieved. It is these grievance that are at the root case of the periodic protests.

The Johannesburg Metro Council, which is responsible for failing to prevent the repeated resettlement of the area now seeks, once again, to relocate the residents to geologically stable land about 10km away. As the the proposed resettlement area is far from shops, amenities, employment opportunities and the social connections offered by Lenasia few Thembalihle residents are happy to be resettled. Unfortunately the geological conditions preclude significant investment in the Thembalihle and it is improbable that grievances about service levels and investment levels will be addressed. The capital investment required to assuage grievances can well be considered as wasted investment or, even worse, a means of encouraging the settlement on unstable land.

Thembalihle residents are thus faced with the option of relocating or to continue occupying the unstable ground. If the council does make a serious attempt to relocate residents a breakdown in the relationships between council and residents may ensue. If residents wish to remain in the area in the face of such a resettlement drive they will possible make the area a no-go zone as far as the council is concerned.

However residents creating a no-go area for the council and, possibly,  rendering the area ungovernable is not he worst case scenario being faced. The latter is represented by accelerated sinkhole activity. Although the informal settlement has been geographically stable for some time the  decline of  mining activity in the larger region has resulted in a rapidly rising water table. Moreover the water now entering the dolomitic deposits is highly acidic - it is the infamous "acid mine water" about which several  apocalyptic  predictions centre. These two factors (the rising water table and its acidity) promise a marked increase in sinkhole activity - and there is little doubt that Thembalihle residents now face increased risks.

The protests in Thembalihle represent one heritage of poor urban management as Johannesburg Metro Council has never demonstrated the political will to ensure that the area is not used for housing. Resettlements that took place in the past were all accompanied by an immediate resettlement of the land. The failure of adequate urban land management gives rise to the current impasse as grievances cannot be addressed (at least not safely).

Fortunately the disputes in Thembalihle are sure to remain localized, however the same can not be said of the protests at Tembisa.

Tembisa

Tembisa  represents a dramatically different situation and has far more wide ranging implications.  In Tembisa protests were sparked less by the absence of services than by the poor quality of the services and the cost of those services. Residents  cited many grievances but most prominent among their grievances was the rapidly rising cost of electricity. This was blamed, variously, on "overcharging" by the council and the installation of pre-paid meters. The impact of electricity prices and suspicions about Ekhuruleni metro Councils efficacy was most vividly expressed by calls that ESKOM be made the service electricity provider.

This latter demand seems to have been particularly misguided. City councils merely resell electricity bought in bulk from ESKOM. The prices of many services provided by the state (electricity, gas, water, road tolls, license fees) are determined administratively i.e. they are determined by the interaction of supply and demand in a competitive setting but on consideration of other issues. The other considerations include the need to provide free basic services, redress of inequities in service levels, affordability and the need to recoup costs. In other words prices are set by political consideration rather than by markets. Be this as it may the costs of services still have to be recouped from either the fiscus or from other taxes or charges.

In recent years administrative charges have been rising more rapidly than market-related prices. In March this year Business Day gave the example:

"... (in the) last month administered prices rose twice as much as general services and three times as much as the average price of consumer goods".

As ESKOM seeks to fund massive new capital projects increases in the price of electricity has been particularly pronounced. These price increase of approximately 25% each year for four years in a row is not exclusively due to capitalisation costs. They have been prompted by the need to (temporarily at least) reduce electrify consumption and pay very lucrative salaries in the parastatal. Recent reports indicate that the average salary in ESKOM  is well in excess of R500 000 per annum. This is more than ten times the value of South Africa' per capita GDP (which, in turn, is higher than average wages).  ESKOM is not alone in presenting massive wage bills. In the three years leading to 2010 the total municipal wage bill rose by 54%. Over this period the total number of municipal employees rose by only 5% indicating that average remuneration in municipalities is rising rapidly . All these costs - capitalisation costs, wage bills etc. have to recouped from consumers - hence the pressure of administered prices. These factors ensure that the cost of municipal services like electricity will continue to increase at above the rate of inflation - irrespective of whether the services are provided by the council or another service provider (like ESKOM).

The Tembisa protests indicate that those setting administrative prices have misread the willingness of township residents to bear the ever increasing remuneration and other costs.

Ultimately this is a political misjudgement by the elected representatives and by those appointed to oversee the provision of essential services. If the political representatives have indeed misread the willingness of consumers to absorb ever-increasing costs, as the Tembisa protests imply, then the latest protests  may just be the first of many against the price of services.  Perhaps we have entered a phase where an increasing proportion of public protests will centre not on the failure to deliver services but on the costs of those services.


What unites the Tembisa and Themblihle protests is the underlying lack of faith residents have in the metropolitan councils. In Thembalihle residents distrust the argument about the impact of dolomite as they witness better services and  infrastructure across the road in Lenasia. Moreover they have not recently been affected by sinkholes. Much of the anger in Tembisa has been brought on by the belief that the council is overcharging them for electricity (hence he call for ESKOM to take over). Ultimately the combination of misjudgement by those setting prices and reservations about the integrity of elected representatives suggest that the issue of public order policing will become even more prominent in the years to come.

SA police, the media and defeating the ends of justice

Media attention has recently been focussed on proposals to exert greater control over it. The proposals include a “media tribunal” and the new Protection of Information bill. In contrast to this concern government agents have defended the proposals as necessary for state security and fairness . Chief spokesman Themba Maseko recently declared that "there is no intention or plan to muzzle the media in any shape or form”, However with attention directed on the explicit attempts to control the “fourth estate” media representative have seemingly been blind to more in insidious moves by the state.

These moves include using existing legislation to achieve the effects envisaged, for example, by the new Protection of Information bill. This bill seeks to criminalise journalists for being in possession of “sensitive” documents that may have been leaked to them. However the recent arrest of Sunday Times journalist Mzilikazi Wa Afrika for, it seems, being in possession of a “fraudulent letter of resignation” suggests that the SA Police Force is already treating the mere possession of sensitive documents as criminal. The initial charges against Afrika were “fraud” and “defeating the ends of justice”.

Although the charge of “defeating the ends of justice” was later dropped in favour of one of “utterance” the fact that this charge was used at all is of concern. “Defeating the ends of justice” is a somewhat vague charge relating to efforts to subvert the judicial process by intimidating witnesses or destroying evidence. If media coverage is anything to go by until recently those charged with the offence were invariably police staff. Examples include Jackie Selebi, the station commissioner who tampered with the drunk driving evidence against Tony Yengeni, former crime intelligence boss Mulangi Mphego and the then head of the Scorpions Gerrie Nel. By contrast it is difficult to find, prior to the appointment of Bheki Cele, reference to the charge being lodged against people outside of the criminal justice system.

In a dramatic departure from this tradition this law is increasingly being used against journalists. In the past two months at least two journalists have been arrested and brought to court for “defeating the ends of justice”. The most recent instance is that of Afrika. In the previous month english journalist Simon Wright faced the charge. The charges against Wright stem from his cloistering of soccer fan Pavlos Joseph in a hotel. During the world cup Josephs entered the English football teams' dressing room to reprimand them for their poor performance. Wright, in his enthusiasm for securing an exclusive interview, booked Josephs into a hotel under a false name. This gave rise to the accusation of him attempting thwart justice from prevailing in Josephs' case. In these instances the veracity the “defeating the ends of justice” charge was justified largely by the vagueness of the allegation. The severity of the charge was aggravated by SAPS intimating, in both instances, that the offences constituted part of a wider conspiracy. The alleged conspiracy, coupled to the vagueness of the charge, invited wild speculation as to what the actual misdeed was.

In court the merits of the “defeating the ends of justice” charges were illustrated by the rapidity with which they were dismissed. The dropping of this charge reflect, on the one hand, the historical difficulty in securing such a conviciton – as was demonstrated in the cases against Selebi , Nel and Mphego. On the other hand the message to journalists remains clear - the police are increasingly prepared to use this charge against them precisely because of the opportunities afforded by its vagueness.

The common theme in both these cases is that the journalists had recently embarrassed the SAPS. Afrika had just accused police head Beki Cele of signing a R500-million lease without observing the required procedures. Wright had pointed out the ease with which a fan could wander into a key area secured by the SAPS. Could it be that the arrests were to punish this behaviour rather than any overt criminal act?

In a short period “defeating the ends of justice” has come to be associated less with tampering with evidence or bribing witnesses and more with journalists publishing the true face of the police.

The extent to which the police hereby undermine the fourth estate is the extent to which they may not need the full measure of the Protection of Information bill. What their action does show is that, assurance that "there is no intention or plan to muzzle the media in any shape or form” aside, the state seeks to cow the media irrespective of whether or not the Protection of Information bill is passed in its current form. Those who view the proponents of the protection of information bill as naïve but well intentioned people operating a bit out of their depth should wake up. In this one regard the writing (on the wall) is getting clearer.