Monday, February 15, 2016

Projections for 2016 local government elections

Before the promises are made, campaigning starts and voter–behaviour surveys begin the only way to predict elections outcomes hold is to examine the past behaviour of voters. The projection of past patterns gives insight into what South Africans can expect when the local government election takes place in the third quarter of 2016. While projections offers an indication as what to expect from the election it should be borne in mind that the objective of election campaigns is largely to alter the expected outcome.

A clear signal of voter intentions for 2016 was already given by the 2014 National/ Provincial election. By extrapolating the changes in voting patterns between the last local government election (2011) and 2014 we can predict that some changes are in the offing for 2016. In particular the ANC can expect declines of about four percent support in Gauteng, the North West province and the Eastern Cape. These declines will be partly offset by a similar percentage gain in ANC vote share in kwaZulu-Natal. The largest movements in votes will be evident in the cities.

In general the ANC can expect to receive a significantly reduced proportion of the votes cast in metropolitan areas and several other cities. As far back as the 2014 National/ Provincial elections the ANC received less than half the proportional representation (PR) votes cast in Nelson Mandela Bay. As that was not a municipal election it did not make any difference to the composition of the metropolitan council then. The changes in support profile are likely to impact on the composition of the municipal council now.

The forecasts indicate that the ANC, while retaining its minority vote share in Cape Town, will lose the absolute majority it currently holds in:
  • Nelson Mandela Bay,
  • Tshwane and
  • Johannesburg.

In these three metropoles the ANC will continue to be the single largest political party but will need the support of opposition councillors to set budgets, pass motions, and enact by-laws. After the election the ANC will hold an absolute majority in only four of the eight metropoles.

The ANC is also likely to lose its absolute majority in other municipalities which are highly urbanised. These include:
  • Randfontein,
  • Kouga,
  • Thabazimbi and
  • Rustenburg.

In Rustenburg the ANC majority, which stood at over three-quarters of votes cast before 2011, has since been whittled away by the opposition – in particular by the EFF.

However the election also portends important gains for the ANC particularly in kwaZulu-Natal. Overall the ANC is set to gain absolute majorities in another 28 municipalities. In almost all of the 28 municipalities the ANC is currently the largest political party, albeit one with less than 50% of popular support. After 2016 election the ANC may well no longer need the support of the opposition to pass budgets and by-laws. While most of the 28 municipalities are in kwaZulu-Natal a handful are in the Western and Northern Cape.

In six of the 28 municipalities the ANC stands to win the municipality from another political party. These include winning (from the IFP):
  • Nkandla and
  • Mthonjeni.

Further south the ANC seems to win several municipalities currently dominated by the DA. These are:
  • Bitou,
  • Laingsburg,
  • Hessequa and
  • Witzenberg.

Exactly how the changing vote patterns impact on the composition of elected councils depends on both how the PR votes are apportioned between wards and the second leg of the election (the election of ward councillors directly). It seems that while a marginal change in the political alignment of larger cities is indicated these changes may have a deep impact on the quality of their governance. Until then each of the political parties will strive to ensure that the outcomes are better than what is expected now.

Detailed results are available at: Projections of ANC support in 2016 municipal elections.



Saturday, April 26, 2014

The real inflation rate

A perennial point of contention among South Africans is the disjuncture between the  rate of inflation  stated by officials and economists and their lived experience.  Individuals increasingly  suggest that the "real" rate of inflation is substantially higher than what, for example, StatsSA tells us it is. To support their claims individuals  are usually able to cite innumerable examples as to why  their experiences debunk the official  CPI (currently at about 6%).

Economists, in retort,  point that the CPI and other estimates of inflation  are scientifically based and drawn from rigorously collected data and known consumption patterns  A great deal of effort is invested by authorities in collecting prices for a predefined basket of goods that mirrors what is known about consumers consumption patterns and purchasing habits. The inflation rate is derived from objective empirical studies that cannot easily be discounted. Pundits then invariably proceed to point out that mismatches are possible as the consumption patterns are  unique to individuals while the CPI measures the aggregate impact.

They further point out that critics of the official rate cite price increases that are most striking while  they remain silent on those products whose prices are rising slowly or even falling. Cellphone charges and the internet bandwith costs have, for example, plummeted just as demand for these utilities become increasingly important.

However these responses indicate lack of insight -  the (supposedly subjective) experience of the critics are not necessarily incompatible with the (objective) official statistics.

On many items consumers  are confronted with price increases that significantly exceed the inflation rate. In recent months these items have come to include food and fuel. In addition administered prices (i.e. prices that are set by state institutions who do not  face competition for their services)  have also risen far faster than the CPI. Included among the latter are municipal rates, the price of electricity and road tolls. One feature common to these products is that there are few or no substitutes and consumers can do relatively little to circumvent them. To ensure there is food on the table, they are able to get to work and their municipal rates are paid individuals have to bear with these increases and cut costs elsewhere. The only place where costs can be cut are on discretionary items like IT and cellphone costs. It is among the latter category that price increases have been most modest.

In other words consumers are unable to take full advantage of stagnant or declining prices as  their income is absorbed by the rapidly increasing cost of essentials and administered prices.  In the process their cost profile rises and their consumption patterns alter. The basket of goods that they consume changes with prices with an ever increasing proportion of the basket being made up of high inflation essentials.

In the interim the economists are deriving the CPI on a stagnant basket of goods - not one where the 20% increase in the cost of food and petrol and electricity is offset by commensurate reduction in consumption elsewhere. The composition of the basket of goods used in deriving the CPI is only reconsidered ever ten years or so. In reality households have to adjust their consumption patterns every time there are sustained increases in prices and not every ten years or so.

So, dear consumer, you may not be losing your grasp on reality. Your personal rate of inflation may be well into the double digits and it is cold comfort that the price of items you can no longer afford are rising less rapidly. On the other hand I suggest that the official statistics will have ever less relevance to individual consumers.

Friday, December 20, 2013

Quality of governance and voting


AG reports and governance

Each year every state department is measured in terms of the extent they have adhered to the laws and regulations laid down with respect to accounting procedures, financial practice, asset control, awarding of contracts and so on. These assessments by the Auditor General (A) speak to the extent to which prescribed minimum standards of governance are met as they present a concise assessment of, inter alia, the levels of wastage and corruption in state departments. As they deliver a seemingly ``objective'' opinion of government performance and are an invaluable measurement of the potential effectiveness of state agencies. The AGs reports on municipal government are of particular interest as they indicate why service levels targets may not have been met, budgets went unspent or how much money was misappropriated or wasted.

Municipalities obtain "clean" audits by being able to demonstrate that they have systematically adhered to the regulations and legislation that govern their functioning. Being able to demonstrate this depends on several factors including the competence of accounting officers, the adequacy of IT and HR systems and presence of effective disincentives for financial abuse. Although service delivery depends heavily of local government performance it is at this tier of government that these factors tend to be least adequate. The MLGI Audit Barometer, for example, shows that 60 percent of local municipalities are substantially in breach of the prescribed regulations and legislation. Moreover, the more optimistic projections indicate that at the current rate of improvement it will be more than a decade before all local municipalities receive "unqualified" audits i.e. audits where substantial deviations from required practice cannot be identified.

Poor audit outcomes are often explained in terms of the lack of suitably qualified staff. The appointment of staff with the required technical competence and the ability to ensure conformance with prescribed policies is essential to achieving a positive audit. It would seem, prima facie, that large towns and cities would be best positioned to attract qualified staff. While this is manifest by most metropolitan municipalities achieving good audit outcomes the view is undermined by the fact that, of all the provinces, the largely rural KwaZulu-Natal local municipalities achieves the best audit outcomes. The MLGI Audit Barometer shows that 83 percent of local municipalities in that province routinely obtain unqualified audits. KwaZulu-Natal is closely followed by the Western Cape where 80 percent of municipalities get clean audits. By contrast in highly urbanised Gauteng 40% of the local and metropolitan municipalities do not routinely get unqualified audits. Similarly many remote rural rural municipalities like uMzimkhulu and Impendle obtain excellent audit outcomes. Obviously the inability to attract suitable personnel is not a key determinant of audit outcomes and reasons for the massive variations in audit outcome thus have to be sought elsewhere.

Voting patterns

In democratic electoral systems determining who fills key administrative positions depends on how much sway political parties hold in the constituency. Consequently elections play a pivotal role in determining who fills key position and, in turn, the quality of service delivery and the diligence with which the rules and regulations are adhered to. In the last local government election in 2011 the ruling party gained controlled of over 85 percent of the 234 local municipalities. Given the predominance of the ANC and the massive variation in the local government audit outcomes no obvious trend between voting patterns and audit outcomes is apparent.

An analysis of voting returns and audit outcomes for 2011/12 reveals that municipalities led by opposition parties (the DA, IFP, NFP etc.) received notably better audit outcomes than ANC led municipalities. On the face of municipalities in the opposition-controlled Western Cape are more likely to receive a positive audit than municipalities in other provinces. However, as indicated above, the best audit outcomes are in kwaZulu-Natal where 80 percent of the local municipalities are controlled by the ruling party. In that province there is little reason why IFP or NFP dominated municipalities should have better audit outcomes than ANC led municipalities. None of these municipalities boast the qualities that would predispose them to positive audit outcomes any more than ANC controlled municipalities in kwaZulu-Natal.

While opposition led municipalities do obtain better audit outcomes this does not seem to be the result of an opposition party being elected. Good audit outcomes are apparent in as many municipalities led by the ruling party. What a correlation between audit outcomes and voting returns does show is that any municipality dominated by a single political party predisposes it to poor audit outcomes. Conversely, not being dominated by a single political party systematically improves audit outcomes. The graphic below illustrates this. It contrasts the distribution of votes obtained by the wining party in
  • municipalities that received an unqualified audit with
  • those that received a qualified (or worse) audit.

It is clear that in those municipalities with qualified audits the winning party typically received about 75% of the total vote. In the vast majority of "qualified" audit municipalities the winning party received at least two-thirds of all votes cast in the 2011 local government elections.


By contrast the winning party in municipalities who got unqualified audits routinely received only about 55% percent of the votes cast. The area where coalitions are required as no one party gained an absolute majority are shown by the lightly shaded area. This shows that only a small percentage of municipalities run by coalitions receive qualified audits. It is seemingly strong political dominance by a single party at the polls that predispose the municipality to poor audit outcomes.

The general trend is:
  • If a single party wins 90 percent of the vote that municipality has virtually no chance of getting an unqualified audit.
  • If two-thirds of the population votes for one party then the municipality has less than a one-in-three chance of getting an unqualified audit.

This later situation approximates the current national situation where the ANC has 66% of the vote share and 30% of municipalities get unqualified audits. If the winning party in a municipality was to get a simple majority (50% of the vote) then the municipality has twice as much chance of getting an unqualified audit.

The kwaZulu-Natal experience in particular shows that audit quality is less influenced by which political party is elected and more by how much competition that political party faces. Moreover this trend bears out irrespective of which political party is dominant. This interpretation indicates that if the ruling party maintained control over the overwhelming majority of municipalities (say the current 85%) audit quality would be improved if its share of votes declined in those municipalities. The same goes for the opposition parties that win municipalities (but no opposition party has a share of votes that remotely approximates the ANC national share of votes).

This relationship indicates that the voters have much to do with audit outcomes and thus directly influence governance quality. However the result has less to do with changing which political party runs the municipality and more to do with ensuring that there is a healthy counter to political dominance. Having a strong opposition ensures greater scrutiny of activities and policies, improved transparency and, ultimately, better quality of governance. Voters can thus improve audit outcomes (and governance quality) even by voting for parties that have no chance of winning the election.

There has been a tendency for disaffected voters in South Africa to abstain from voting. However this results only is a race to the bottom as party performance in elections then depends on who loses the least number of supporters. This analysis shows that voters can improve governance quality by transferring their vote to another party - even one destined to lose. The one key question that has yet to answered is whether or not voters do in fact reward performance at the polls.

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Zuma and the rise of the right.

At the last general election the ANC, recently placed under the stewardship of Jacob Zuma, was returned to power with the mandate of another 2 million voters. A
t the time pundits attributed the increased support to trade union and the ANC Youth League support for Zuma. However since that election there has been a funda
mental realignment within the ANC which should become readily apparent in Mangaung next month. Those factions attributed with giving the ANC its increased mandate are now among those most opposed to Zuma being elected for a second term. By contrast those supporting Zuma are a strange mixture of "radicals" and conservatives including MK veterans, religious leaders, the SACP and traditional leaders.

The realignment does not represent Zumas betrayal of his backers. Rather it reflects the recognition that the additional votes came primarily from "tribal" areas.  At last count approximately one-quarter of South Africans of voting age resided in what are now referred to as "traditional" areas. This makes this constituency one of the most influential in the country and in the ANC.

The features that unite Zuma supporters are becoming ever more apparent. Not only are these groups socially conservative, they tend to be highly patriarchal and, at heart, anti-democratic. To gain the support of these groups candidates have to focus on beguiling their leaders rather than the rank and file. Zuma has to appeal not to the soldiers, congregants and subjects but to an elite of generals, bishops and kings. Obviously this calls for a fundamentally different approach to the populism of the Youth League we grew accustomed to. 

Zuma's pursuit of support from traditional leaders is shown by the ANC's dogged pursuit of "traditional courts". For some time the Department of Justice has been attempting to pass legislation which grants tribal chiefs the right to try criminal and civil cases and impose sanctions as they see appropriate. The procedures and sanctions adopted in these courts are to accord with traditional law and cultural practices.

The Traditional Courts Bill has stalled on repeated rejection by the affected communities.  While the media has tended to emphasise the criticism voiced by women, opposition to the bill is widespread. In the public hearings on the bill men have tended to dominate proceedings both numerically and in vociferousness. They dismiss the bill with as much vigour as that attributed to women. Despite the opposition (which extends into cabinet) the Zuma administration continues to promote the legislation.

Despite the opposition and its obvious unconstitutionality the bill being pushed through because of the advantages it offers traditional leaders. In return traditional leaders can deliver the support of their subjects - at both Mangaung and at the ballot box.

The ANC will probably deny that the phalanx of legislation focussing on traditional areas entrenches partriarchal and anti-egalitarian systems. Admittedly there are now more women on Traditional Councils. Legislation requires that 30 percent of representatives are women. This is all well and good except for the fact that there is no popular support for Traditional Councils and these Councils have no power to speak of. Not only do these elections not meet the criteria for being free-and-fair turnout in Traditional Council elections typically run at less than ten percent of the eligible population.  The reason for the low turnout lies in the negligible influence elected representatives have in the Councils.  Most people on the council are not elected but are appointed by the tribal leaders. Moreover, just as traditional courts are not compelled to observe the precepts of natural justice, the Traditional Councils are not required to adhere to the basic principles of democratic practice. Chiefs are not bound by the majority vote of the Councils. Given this it is surprising that so many people bother to vote in Traditional Council elections at all. 

Constitutional democrats may well have felt relief when the populist Youth Leagues fell from Zuma's grace. Current tension between the ANC and unions  may even comfort those who fear the influence of the left within the ANC. However the alignment of the ANC leader with anti-democratic factions will prove to be far more worrisome. When he resebtly addressed the National House of Traditional Leaders Zuma encouraged them to reject "white mans justice". His justification rests on the view that "white mans justice" turns on cold facts rather than the "warm bodies" prioritised by indigenous justice systems. Zuma echoed criticisms of the judicial system as retributive, overly codified and "un-african". However the constitution now forms the bedrock of that "white mans justice". This perspective coupled with the bulldozing of the Traditional Courts and entrenching the undemocractic Traditional Councils on the most vulnerable communities in the country suggest that Zuma may be similarly predisposed to dismissing the constitution. He seems ready to court traditional authorities in the name of "Africanness" regardless of how it undermines democracy or how  devisive it is within the ANC.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012


Surprises in the South African census of 2011
========================================================

The results of the 2011 South African census were release in November 2011. The top-line results revealed a few surprises including a higher than expected population growth rate. The population total of 51.7 million was 2.5 percent greater than StatsSA's  mid-year population estimates for that year. This indicates a population 1.2 million more than anticipated.

Apparently the census also indicates an increase in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) which rose to 2.7 from the 2.5 of a decade earlier. Apparently an increase in TFR  typified all the major population groups classified in the census. While an eight percent increase in TFR may not appear unduly worrisome it actually has has profound implications for our understanding of development. In terms of Demographic Transition Theory an increase in TFR (and by implication in the IMR) indicates a society under great stress. Recent examples of such increase include war-time Afghanistan and Zambia under the IMF structural adjustment programme. The IMF's structural adjustment programmes greatly restricted  access to  health services in Zambia allowing for massive increased in mortality and fertility rates.

According to StatsSA the past ten years in South Africa has been marked by just such trauma. Part of the trauma is related to the impact of HIV/AIDS on the dominant population group. HIV/AIDS may have resulted in the observed increase in mortality rates. In response  families were prompted to having a greater number of children giving rise to higher TFR.

However the data revealed by StatsSA shows that the increase in family size has primarily taken place in the past past five years. The graphic below shows the marked increase in the youngest five year age cohort.


The last five years has coincided with the period in which the impact of HIV/AIDS was greatly reduced by widespread uptake of AVRs. HIV/Aids thus offers an unconvincing argument for the increase in TFR.

The results of the census thus either confirm that a) South African society has been under such profound stress that the Demographic Transition has been reversed or b) a more mundane answer lies in the quality of StatsSA's tallying.

Monday, August 20, 2012

South African democracy: the beginning of the end?

An instinctive response to  the killing of 34 strikers by the police on August 16 is that the event may herald  the end of state tolerance of dissent. Along with the 34 the assumption that state violence will not be lightly used to suppress opposition died.  Although much public debate on the reasons for the incident followed  the incident these discourses centered on explanations for the miners militancy or rationales for the polices' violence. The first perspective tended  to "justify"  the  strikers actions in terms of their personal circumstances or on rivalry between competing trade unions.

The miserable social conditions that allegedly underpins the strikers militancy broadly reflects what happens in areas where the local economy is collapsing. Declining service levels, increasing unemployment, income supplementation through prostitution, illicit brewing, alcohol sales, crime etc. now typify the areas surrounding many platinum mines like Lonmin.  These difficult circumstances contribute to miners militancy and to the ability of a upstart union to organise industrial action under the nose of a trade union that has long dominated the industry. The arguments that focus on the impact of social conditions are undermined by the clear focus the miners had on remuneration and by the fact that the strikers are probably better paid than those who shot them. 

While the social conditions may have contributed to discrediting the established National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) they do not offer insight into why the police played a central role in the rivalry.

Although NUM has long been established as the main union representing underground workers at Lonmin the strikes were organized by a fledgling rival AMCU. Clearly the dominance of the ANC-aligned National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was challenged by the strike and some pundits viewed the  heavy-handed police action as state support for their embattled political ally.

Much public debate focused on the militancy of the miners and the threat they posed to the police and other miners. It is repeatedly pointed out that by the time the strikers stormed off the hillock on which they had gathered ten people (including two police officers) had already been murdered in the conflict. It is from his vantage point that most discussions around the appropriateness of the police response proceeds. This discourse then revolved around assessments of the threat posed by the strikers, the ability of the police to protect themselves and others  etc.

 However a central ingredient is missed in all these debates. By the time the strikers were driven from the hillock by police teargas the order to use lethal force (sharp ammunition)  had already been issued. When the strikers stormed off the hillock towards  the police the SAPS had already  dispensed with crowd control control formations  and non-lethal gear. The police has already demobilised the public-order police units in favour of deploying the elite National Intervention Unit (NIU). The NIU is a unit tasked with dealing with high risk conflict situations. The shields, dogs, batons, perimeter control mechanisms that are central to containing violent situations had been withdrawn in favour of a large, highly trained force armed only with lethal weapons.

Furthermore the police were deployed in a pattern that ensured that the strikers could not but run towards them if they were to escape the teargas lobbed at them. When they stormed off the hillock they strikers could not do anything but run towards the police who, in turn, we're unable to respond with anything other than their automatic weapons primed with sharp rounds.  And fire the police did - until all the strikers were down. The strikers were not given an opportunity to surrender or escape.

In other words points about police preparedness, their level of training, the threat the strikers posed etc. are moot - the die had been cast before the first volleys of teargas were lobbed at the hill.

Authority to use sharps rounds can only be issued by the ranking SAPS officer - in this situation this was the recently appointed commissioner Phiyega. The resultant massacre would, on the face of it, support  calls for police commissioners to be appointed from within police ranks. Perhaps a commissioner more familiar with crowd control and the volatile situations may have prevented the biggest mass ace in South Africa since Sharpeville. By intimation it was the commissioners inexperience that caused the massacre. However this perspective is undermined by the explanations that followed the incident. The day's events were followed by a sanctimonious blathering about the danger the strikers posed to others and how they were belligerent and superstitious they were. The subtext of these explanations was that the strikers got what they deserved. The fact that there were no police casualties on the day of the  massacre suggests that the magnitude of the threat posed by the strikers was probably exaggerated.

However an explanation is still needed as to why the NIU had been deployed and the non-lethal measures withdrawn. Was this, for example, an attempt to neutralise a militant rival to the established union? Such explanations miss a key dimension to the conflict - the close alignment between Lonmin and the upper echelons of the ruling party. For example in its former guise as "Lonrho", Lonmin reputedly bankrolled several of the leading ANC families both while they were in exile and on their return to South Africa in the mid 1990s.  Currently ANC heavyweight Cryril Ramaphosa is a (non-executive) director of Lonmin. It was also Lonmin that stood to benefit most from the ending of the strike. The platinum sector is going through a crisis with falling PGM prices, greatly reduced demand for their product as well as rapidly increasing costs structure. Of particular importance is the cost of electricity used by the mines and associated processors. These factors ensure that not only could the mine not accede to the strikers demands they could not afford to cover running costs while a small component of the total workforce  halted production.  Only about ten percent of the Lonmin workforce joined the strike yet those 3 000 rock-drillers were able to stop production.

Clearly Lonmin stood to benefit most from the collapse of the strike than anybody.  The events of the day represent nothing more sophisticated than the state acting in the interests of big capital and the ruling party. Unless the commission of inquiry is able to provide a more convincing account as to why non-lethal force was withdrawn we really do need to ask whether or not this is the end of the tolerance of dissent required of a functioning democracy.

Tuesday, June 5, 2012

The ANC is the new IFP


Is the ANC the new IFP?

The National Chamber of Provinces recently concluded public hearing on the Traditional Courts Bill. This bill seeks to give traditional leaders the power to preside over certain civil disputes and criminal offences in the areas under their jurisdiction. The public hearings were an opportunity for those affected by the proposed legislation to voice their concerns about its impact. It was also an opportunity for the provincial legislatures to claim they had consulted affected communities before they endorsed the legislation.

Not surprisingly the bill was met with a great deal of resistance by civil society and community members. It is clear from the public hearings that community members are concerned that traditional leaders, some of whom are corrupt, ineffectual or partisan, are formally being given greater powers. Civil societies' objections centred on the negative impact the bill, if passed, will have on women's rights. The general thrust of criticism is that hereditary leadership in a highly patriarchal and authoritarian social setting undermines the rights of all commoners, particularly women, and is in clear conflict with the constitutions core premise of "equality". Essentially the bill entrenches the right,by birth, of some to judge and govern and the obligation  of all others, by virtue of where they live, to be judged and ruled.

The hearings in kwaZulu-Natal were particularly enlightening. They showed unequivocal support among traditional leaders for the bill. The reason for this consensus is clear as senior traditional leaders are all set to benefit from this and other proposed changes. However the most remarkable part of the hearings  was the absence of the antipathy between the ANC and the IFP that has long marked politics in kaZulu-Natal  - particularly when traditional rights and culture were concerned. There was no sign of dissent between chiefs aligned to different parties or between the chiefs and the sponsors of the bill i.e. Luthuli House.

This consensus highlights the extent to which the political landscape in kwaZulu-Natal has changed.  Those seeking to preserve traditional African culture, hereditary rights or general social conservatism in kwaZulu-Natal can now identify with the ruling party rather than with the IFP whose influence  has been waning since 1994. The ANC has managed to appropriate a rich political terrain once monopolised by the IFP.  Understanding how much the terrain has changed rests on acknowledgment of the extent to which the ANC has moved to the IFP's value system rather than through the political evolution of Zululand residents. It is this change in the ANC that invites the perspective that the ANC is the new IFP. It is the ANC that now promises to preserve hereditary rights, traditional values and promote the associated social conservatism.

The reason for the shift in the ANC is clear. In 2009 the ANC was returned to power with votes just shy of a two thirds majority. When compared to the previous national election (in 2004) voters gave the ANC an additional 1.2 million votes. This increase in votes was widely seen as an endorsement of the ANC under Zuma's leadership. However the addition votes were garnered not, as the political pundits claimed, from the left, the unions or from the youth. The increase in votes were almost entirely from traditional areas in kwaZulu-Natal and other provinces.  As people living in other provinces on "traditional" land had largely thrown their lot in with the ANC already their contribution to the increased ANC vote was less pronounced. 

Traditional leaders are key to the continued support of any political party in what was previously referred to as "tribal areas". The chiefs exert tremendous influence on whether or not people vote and on whom they vote for. For example in the 2009 election the IFP still managed to get 800 000 votes and these votes are now, in a very real sense, there for the taking. Given the changing political landscape there is little reason to suggest that the chiefs will take them to the new National Freedom Party or keep them with the IFP.

Inevitably there is a qui pro quo for this support. The first sign of the quid pro quo was the establishment of a Department of Rural Development and Land Reform within a month of the election. This was followed by the re-invigoration of traditional councils and , belatedly, the holding of traditional council elections. Reviving the Traditional Courts Bill (which had stalled in 2008) followed.  Still to come is the  National Traditional Affairs Bill which may well extend local government powers to traditional leaders.

All this bodes poorly for the IFP as traditional leaders no longer have to look to the IFP to advance their interests and traditional rights in general. The ANC is now happily fulfilling this role - even at the expense of the core values of the constitution and what the ANC's has been describing as its own political heritage. This said, the support that the traditional leaders bring will inevitably be at the cost of some of support it currently enjoys from what the ANC itself terms "progressives". For example, although the Womens League has been silent about the promotion of the Traditional Courts bill their complicity in the promotion of such patriarchal systems can not continue indefinitely. Until then the extent to which  ANC support is derived from traditional leaders is the extent to which Zuma's position will be secure relative to the "progressives".